Payment Issues

Recently there have been some problems with our payment processor.

One of these is that sometimes there is a significant delay in completing a transaction, so the funds are “reserved” but the transaction isn’t actually completed until a few weeks later.

The other problem was that a number of charges were made to some of our customers’ credit cards, in our name. The majority of these are USD 1.00 test charges that are used to verify that a card is valid. Normally we cancel these charges immediately and the charge doesn’t appear on the card statement. However the problem at our payment processor has resulted in some of these supposedly “cancelled” charges recently being applied to customer cards. A number of other charges which were supposed to be “cancelled” have also been processed. This was done in error and without any instructions from FastMail.

We are currently working with our payment processor to refund these erroneous payments. In some cases, the refunds are unable to be processed directly because the card has expired or been cancelled.

We may need to refund these charges via an alternative method, or, at the user’s option, instead credit the amount towards future FastMail renewals. We will be in touch with the affected customers once we have more information on the scope of the problem.

We would like to assure our users that we will make certain that all erroneous charges are corrected. This may take some time, so thanks for your patience.

Our apologies for any inconvenience or confusion. We will post more information as it becomes available.
– the FastMail team

Posted in Technical. Comments Off

New phishing trick, data: URLs to avoid forgery reporting

This is a technical post about a new and interesting phishing technique seen today. Regular FastMail users can skip this post.

We saw an interesting new phishing attempt today that uses a relatively novel technique to try and hide the source of the attack and avoid it being reported as a web forgery.

Firstly the email itself looks reasonably well done (apart from the year in the subject being completely wrong), certainly it’s not the poor quality you often see. It looked like this (ANZ is an Australian bank):

phishing

Secondly, the email was sent using a compromised gmail account with a .edu address. In fact there were two separate emails, both from different compromised gmail .edu accounts. I imagine compromised gmail .edu accounts aren’t that easy to get, and this significantly reduced the chances of it being caught by any spam filter.

Thirdly, the phishing page itself is interesting in that it:

  1. Uses a standard link shortener for a redirect (http://ow.ly in this case)
  2. Which redirects to the phishing delivery page (a compromised page on http://zerra-performance-center.de)
  3. That page however rather than hosting the HTML phishing login page directly, does this:

<script type="text/javascript">
        window.location="data:text/html;base64,... base64 encoded version of HTML phishing login page ...";
</script>

That data: URL is itself the phishing page content, which includes links to real ANZ website logos to make it look as authentic as possible, but has a form submit action to a compromised page on http://lucinaracosta.com.br.

This approach is interesting because it makes it impossible to report this page as a forgery using the standard Firefox "Report Web Forgery" action because Firefox thinks it’s a data: URL. Neat trick that makes it harder to remove or block in the long run.

I’ve reported this issue as a Firefox bug: https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1032564

Posted in Technical. Comments Off
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